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Plaintiff/Appellant,

)
)
)
)
)
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BEAVERS,

)
)
)
)
Defendants and
)
Appellee (Bountiful only))
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Priority No. 16

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
STANLEY C. JONES
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE
DEFENDANT BOUNTIFUL CITY CORP.
ISSUED APRIL 29, 1991
ARGUMENT
I.

IF BOUNTIFUL FAILS TO KEEP ITS HIGHWAYS AND STREETS IN A
SAFE CONDITION. IT HAS NO IMMUNITY FROM SUIT UNDER THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION CLAUSE
The

core

question

relating

to this appeal

is the

relationship
10(1)(a).

between

Utah

Code

Ann.

§63-30-8

and

§63-30-

That relationship, to the extent it has been directly

and indirectly addressed in Utah cases, was thoroughly addressed
in Jones1 original brief.
lengths

to

quote

In response, Bountiful goes to great

numerous

cases

from

other

jurisdictions

regarding the relationship between their particular state and
local statutes on this question.

However, foreign case law is

irrelevant in light of the unique nature of the Utah statutory
scheme and the Utah cases that have already considered to some
extent the relationship between §63-30-8 and the discretionary
function clause.

The position taken by Jones in the original

brief is unrefuted.

Numerous Utah cases indicate that injuries

caused by unsafe or dangerous conditions of streets in Utah is a
governmental

activity

for which

immunity

from

suit has been

expressly waived and it is not within the discretionary function
exception of the Governmental

Immunity Act.

See Richard v.

Leavitt, 716 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), Bowen v. Riverton City, 656
P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) and Biaelow V. Inaersoll. 618 P.2d 50 (Utah
1980) .
Moreover,

Bountiful's

brief

presents

no

additional

information by way of Utah statute or case law to support its
contention that §63-30-10(1)(d) should be read any more broadly
in its scope to restrict the waiver of immunity in §63-30-8 than
the discretionary function provision.
Bountiful does contend that §63-30-8 waives immunity
only for defective, unsafe, or dangerous conditions physically
2

located on a particular road or street.

Bountiful's position is

that any condition that makes a road or street defective, unsafe,
or dangerous that does not actually exist on and in the physical
road or street itself is beyond the scope of the act and there is
no waiver of immunity provided therefor.
supported

by

the

indicates

there

language
is

in

§63-30-8

liability

for

condition of any road or street.
immunity

to

conditions.

only

certain

Certainly

any

This argument is not
itself.

The statute

unsafe

or

dangerous

It does not limit the waiver of

causes

of

unsafe

or

dangerous

it is clear that dangerous or unsafe

conditions of roadways or streets may be created by circumstances
other than conditions inherent in the street or roadway itself.
The facts and holding in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d
276 (Utah 1985) support Jones1 contention that §63-30-8 must be
read

more

broadly.

In

that

case

a

plaintiff

charged

a

municipality with negligence in allowing trees, shrubs, and other
growths to obscure a stop sign at an intersection.
Court

did

not

indicate

that

the

trees and

The Richards

shrubs were not

technically part of the roadway or street itself or that they
were on private rather than public property.

Such technical

issues were irrelevant to the question of whether the growth made
the

condition

of

the

road

or

street

unsafe

or

dangerous.

Richards held that if bushes obscured a stop sign, a municipality
may be liable under the waiver of immunity contained in §63-30-8.
In the present case we are dealing with the unsafe
condition of an uncontrolled

intersection of two roads.
3

In

considering what is necessary to maintain a safe condition for
such a situcition, clear sight lines for vehicles approaching the
uncontrolled intersection are the primary safety considerations.
A street may exist that, considered in a vacuum by itself, is
flawless

from

workmanship,

a mechanical
however,

does

and technical
not

shield

perspective.
a

Good

municipality

from

liability if outside influences or conditions render the road
dangerous or unsafe.
II.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED S41-6-19 AND S63-30-8 CREATE A
MANDATORY LEGAL DUTY ON BOUNTIFUL TO FACILITATE THE REMOVAL
OF FOLIAGE OBSTRUCTIONS ON PRIVATE PROPERTY.
§41-6-19 and §63-30-8 are clear and unambiguous.

When

read together, they impose a mandatory legal duty on Bountiful to
facilitate

the

removal

property.

Bountifulfs

of

obstructing

arguments

that

foliage

on

Bountiful1s

private
duty

was

directory and permissive whether than mandatory once again rely
primarily on other states1 interpretations of their own statutes
and case law.

The only Utah case relied on by Bountiful, Stevens

v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d 496 (Utah 1970), is distinguishable
because the plaintiff

in that case was traveling on private

property at the time his vision was obstructed by foliage.

He

was not using the public roads of the state of Utah or any of its
local municipalities.
To attempt to distinguish each of the foreign cases
cited by Bountiful would be possible but relatively fruitless
given the differences in facts and in the statutory governmental
immunity schemes

from state to state and from case to case.
4

Prokop v. Wayne County Board of Commissioners, 424 N.W.2d 10
(Michigan

1988), cited by Bountiful in its brief, is a good

illustration

of

the

futility

of

relying

on

foreign

cases.

Factually, Prokop bears great similarity to the present case.

A

bicyclist brought a claim against a county alleging that the
failure to trim a hedge row that obstructed vision and that was
located on private property breached the municipality's legal
duty to the bicyclist.

In the alternative, the plaintiff claimed

that the county breached its duty to order the private property
owner to trim the hedge.

The trial court granted the defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment and the Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Prokop is easily distinguishable.

First, the accident

occurred at an intersection controlled by a traffic light.

As

noted above, the importance of maintaining unobstructed sight
lines becomes
Second,

it

all-important

was

based

on

at

an uncontrolled

a Michigan

statute

intersection.
that

was more

ambiguous and lenient than §63-30-8 as to the standard that the
municipality was required to adhere to regarding the safety of
its roads.

The Michigan statute stated:

Each governmental agency having jurisdiction
over any highway shall maintain the highway
in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably
safe and convenient for public travel . . . .
The duty
of the state and the county road
commissions to repair and maintain highways,
and the liability therefor, shall extend only
to the improved portion of the highway
designed for vehicular travel . . .

5

The Utah standard contained in §63-30-8 is more specific both as
to the waiver of liability and to the condition of the road.
Third, the Michigan language limited the duty of municipalities
only to the improved portion of the highway.

Fourth, Michigan

had no statute imposing a duty on municipalities to notify owners
that obstructing foliage must be removed.

The third and fourth

reasons were the ultimate bases for Prokop *s holding that no duty
could

be

imposed

distinguishable,

on

it

the

actually

county.
supports

Not
the

only

is

plaintiff.

Prokop
The

Michigan Court suggested that had there been a statute requiring
the county to regulate sight obstructions the ruling might have
been different.

Prokop, supra, at p. 13.

It is to Utah cases and statutes that this Court must
look in determining whether a duty under §41-6-19 and §63-30-8
exists, whether it is mandatory, and whether there is a genuine
issue of fact about Bountiful carrying out its duty in the manner
the statute requires.

Having determined that the statute does

impose a mandatory duty on Bountiful, to, at the very least,
notify the property owner that the foliage is a traffic hazard
and order that it be removed, and having shown through reference
to §63-30-8 that there is no immunity from suit for negligent
municipal acts or omissions creating unsafe roads, Point II in
Bountiful1s brief is answered.

The only remaining question as to

whether Bountiful failed to carry out its legal duty is an issue
of fact for a jury to decide.

6

III.

THE WAIVER OF IMMUNITY UNDER S63-30-8 MAY EXTEND TO
BOUNTIFULfS FAILURE TO PLACE TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES AT THE
INTERSECTION,
Bountiful goes to great length in Argument III in its

brief to persuade the Court that the discretionary

function

provision of the Governmental Immunity Act makes Bountiful immune
from liability for its decision not to place a traffic control
device at the intersection in question.

The problem with this

position is that it ignores the plain language of §63-30-8 as it
read at the time of the accident and Utah case law.

As noted

earlier, conditions other than the actual surface of the road or
street may make the condition of a highway unsafe or dangerous•
These conditions are not limited simply to foliage obstructing
the vision of drivers using the street but may extend to the
volume of traffic on the street or to warning of subtle dangers.
It

is

certainly

not

unreasonable

to

suggest

that

Bountiful may be subject to suit if, based on expert testimony
and

facts

about

obstructions

to vision,

volume

of traffic,

configuration of the roads, and other facts, there is a failure
to take reasonable precautions to warn of hazards and as part of
that duty

to take measures to provide some sort of traffic

control device for the intersection.

This is consistent with the

language in §63-30-8 and the language in McQuillan on Municipal
Corporations as cited by Jones in his original brief.
As for the cases cited by Bountiful in support of its
position in Argument III, most of the cases are from foreign
states.

For the reasons referred to above, they are of little
7

help in suggesting to the Court how this case should be decided.
The Utah cases that Bountiful relies on actually support Jones'
position,

Gleave v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad

Company, 749 P.2d 660 (Utah 1988) is distinguishable because, for
whatever reason, the parties in that case did not present §63-308 in support or defense of their arguments.

Because that case

did

§63-30-8

not

consider

discretionary

the

relationship

between

and

the

function clause, Gleave's precedential value is

limited.
As for Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad, 790 P. 2d 595
(Utah

1990) , the Court held that UDOT was

immune under the

discretionary function clause from liability only " . . .

for its

failure to better maintain or to enhance the signage

[at an

intersection].'1

Duncan, supra at 601.

The Duncan Court did note

in its discussion of Bowen, supra. that " . . .the government may
be held
control
added.)

liable in tort to provide some effective warning or
for traffic at a city

intersection."

Id.

(emphasis

Moreover, as Justice Jackson notes in his concurring

opinion, the Duncan appellant, like the appellant in Gleave,
never pleaded or contended that the immunity provided under the
discretionary function clause of the Governmental Immunity Act
was waived under §63-30-8.
Jackson

took

pains

to

Duncan, supra, at 603.
point

out

that

§63-30-8

Justice
exists

independently from the discretionary function clause and neither
Gleave nor Duncan should be read as limiting the analyses of
Bowen, supra, and Richards, supra, when they suggest that the
8

discretionary function clause provides no immunity when injuries
result from a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of a
public street or highway.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING JONES1
MOTION TO CONTINUE AND IN GRANTING BOUNTIFULfS SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
In Bountiful's brief, a chronology of events relating

to

discovery

reflects

in

the

lawsuit

Jones1

that

is presented.

Motion

to

Continue

The

chronology

Consideration

of

Bountiful's Motion of Summary Judgment was not filed with the
Court on March 4, 1991.

In fact, the Motion was signed and

mailed to opposing counsel on February 22, 1991, four days before
oral argument

of Bountiful!s Motion.

More

importantly,

the

written Motion to Continue was presented to the Court together
with making an oral Motion to Continue on the record at the
February 26, 1991 hearing.
hearings, p. 13.
completely

aware

Transcript of the February 26, 1990

Both opposing counsel and the Court were
of

Jones1

written

and

oral

requests

that

consideration of the Motion be continued at the hearing of the
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Bountiful relies on Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 795
P. 2d 482

(Utah App.

1990) in claiming that unless a formal

affidavit is filed in connection with a Rule 56(f) Motion, that
motion must fail.

However, as noted by this Court in Strand v.

Associated Students of University of Utah. 561 P.2d 191 (Utah
1977),

the

evidentiary

information

required

by

Rule

56(f)

need

not be

in form but is simply to provide the Court with
9

specific reasons showing why continuance of consideration of a
Motion for Summary Judgment is necessary•

Strand, supra at 194.

Statements were made by Jones1 counsel both in writing and orally
at the hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and as an officer of the Court that
provided information sufficient to evaluate the factors outlined
in Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, supra.

To accept Bountiful's

argument that the absence of an affidavit from Jones' counsel
dooms

the Motion

is to elevate

form

over

substance without

realizing any equivalent benefit for the sacrifice.
The reasons outlined by Jones1 counsel in the Motion to
Continue

were

(1)

outstanding

discovery

cutoff was two months away, and

issues were being explored.

discovery

existed,

(2)

the

(3) other factual

If this Court rules that Bountifulfs

duty is dependent to some degree on the notice it had of sight
obstructions at the intersection, there is no question that the
discovery Jones sought is at the core of Jones' claim.

In light

of the April 22, 1991 discovery cutoff in the case, approximately
two months after hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment,
there is nothing to suggest that Jones' discovery was untimely.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 3^

DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1991.
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